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Abstract:  
Around 1940 Schumpeter draws on an analysis of the U.S. footwear industry as an exemplar case to 
formulate his famous hypothesis about the positive relation between market concentration and 
innovative activity. Starting in the 1970s the value chain of U.S. footwear producers disintegrates, 
eventually separating the process of product innovation from manufacturing in this industry. Studies 
testing Schumpeter’s hypothesis commonly do not account for the modularity and globalization of 
an industry’s value chain. Schumpeter having neglected the demand side in his theorizing, we argue 
that the separation of product innovation and manufacturing in the U.S. footwear industry is 
influenced by functional satiation effects on demand. If the functional requirements of consumers 
are met, their willingness to pay for ever more product varieties decreases. Since the early 1970s the 
‘oversupply’ of new product varieties and the simultaneously decreasing price level drive market 
growth beyond functional satiation (Frenzel Baudisch, 2006b). In this paper we argue that this 
simultaneous price and innovation competition separates the product innovation process from 
manufacturing to gain economies in both of these processes simultaneously. Discussing the 
consumers’ motivations to buy products beyond their functional requirements offers a deeper 
qualitative understanding of the business practices revealed in the historical case of the U.S. 
footwear industry.  
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Since the writing of Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Schumpeter, 1942), 
economists have increasingly been willing to associate economic growth through 
innovation with monopoly power and large firm size. Schumpeter (1939, ch. VI, VII, and 
XIV) founds his theorizing on historical evidence from the U.S., the English, and the 
German economy. Schumpeter (1939, pp. 391) explicitly draws on the case of the U.S. 
footwear industry that his research assistant Hoover (1933; 1937) has developed
1. In this 
sense, the U.S. footwear industry is more than substantiating the Schumpeter hypothesis, 
Hoover’s case study helps Schumpeter (1942, ch. VII and VIII) develop his arguments 
that have later been subsumed under the label ‘Schumpeter hypothesis’
2. In the first half 
of the 20
th century, the global footwear production is extremely concentrated in the hand 
of the United Shoe Machinery Company, which attains and maintains its global 
monopoly position by being extremely innovative, because it re-invests its monopoly 
rents into research and development (cf. Kaysen, 1956; Thomson, 1989; Miranda, 2004). 
The driving force behind the economic dynamics that Schumpeter describes is the 
promise of economic profits achieved through innovative activity. According to 
Schumpeter (1942, pp.101), large firm size is essential to the success of such innovative 
activity, because larger firms can provide economies of scale in manufacturing and 
innovation processes which make available sufficient resources necessary for successful 
completion of this process.  Several empirical studies have shed doubt on the generality 
of Schumpeter’s hypothesis (e.g. Kamien & Schwartz, 1982; Cohen & Levin, 1989). 
These and other studies usually investigate into the relationship between innovative 
activity and industry concentration or firm sizes, but not into the concrete organization of 
the production process or the sources of product innovation. Remarkably, since the 
1980s, product innovation is effectively separated from manufacturing processes in 
several U.S. industries, like footwear, apparel, toys and consumer electronics (Gereffi & 
Korzeniewicz, 1994; Korzeniewicz, 1994; Gereffi, 1999; Sturgeon, 2002; Gereffi, 
Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). The U.S. footwear industry having been Schumpeter’s 
exemplar case has been among the first industries to show this disintegration of the value 
chain (Donaghu & Barff, 1990; Korzeniewicz, 1992; Korzeniewicz, 1994; Schmitz & 
Knorringa, 2000; Frenkel, 2001). A value chain describes the full range of activities that 
are required to bring a product from its conception to its end use and beyond. This 
includes activities such as design, production, marketing, distribution and support to the 
final consumer. The activities that comprise a value chain can be contained within a 
single firm – like Schumpeter hypothesized – or divided among different firms – as the 
historical development in the 1970s and 1980s shows in these mentioned industries. The 
separation of product innovation and manufacturing raises several new questions about 
genuine argument of the Schumpeter hypothesis: How can the innovation process be 
separated from manufacturing? How can the developing firm appropriate its product 
technology against the manufacturing firm? Why do the actual producers not enter the 
                                                 
1 Cf. footnote 1 on p. 391 in Schumpeter’s (1939) “Business Cycles” for his personal expression of 
gratitude to Hoover as his assistant. 
2 Cf. Witt (2002) for an historical outline of the perception of Schumpeter in evolutionary economics. 
  1market bypassing the product developers? This empirical caveat to the Schumpeter 
hypothesis and the resulting questions motivate the present paper. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framing for the outlined empirical caveat. 
Schumpeter having neglected the demand side in his arguments, the basis argument of 
this paper is that satiation effects occur as a market matures and that they affect the 
organization of the processes of product innovation and manufacturing. The correlation 
of the increase of product variety and the growth of consumption is a stylized fact of 
aggregate market dynamics (Bils & Klenow, 2001). This correlation between the growth 
of product variety and consumption holds regardless of the maturity of the industry or the 
market. So, at the macro level functional satiation effects do not uphold this correlation, 
even in mature markets. In contrast, at the micro level, Lancaster (1971, pp.145; 1991, 
pp.59) in his seminal conceptualization of product innovations points to satiation effect 
with respect to product characteristics, i.e. the functional aspects of products. In their 
experiments Meyer and Johnson (1995) find that while consumers have a minimum 
threshold for acceptable product performance, there is no analogous boundary that 
specifies a maximum limit to the functional performance, that a consumer would be 
willing to accept. At the same time, consumers face decreasing marginal utility from 
increases in functionality beyond their requirements, i.e., when they are functionally 
satiated. From a series of case studies Christensen (1997, ch.8) develops the notions of 
“functional satiation” and “performance oversupply” that Adner and Levinthal (2001) 
formalize: They show that consumption growth beyond functional satiation relies on the 
oversupply of ever new product varieties and on the decline of relative prices to account 
for the decreasing marginal utility. In short, the nature of competition can change due to 
such satiation effects of market demand.  
In a time-series analysis Frenzel Baudisch (2006b) shows that aggregate U.S. footwear 
consumption changes its parameterization in 1970 in accordance with Adner and 
Levinthal’s (2001) model of market growth beyond functional satiation: Since the 1970s 
the U.S. shoe market expands due to the oversupply of product varieties as relative shoe 
prices decline in parallel; the market grows well beyond the functional requirements of 
consumers, as the average U.S. consumer buys 7.4 pairs of shoes in 2004. Focusing at the 
U.S. footwear market and its industry, the theoretical question that this paper wants to 
answer is whether the functional satiation of this market affects its industrial 
organization. In other words, do firms organize differently in order for them to grow as 
the functional satiation of the market is setting in, as the incumbent firms have to 
oversupply the market with ever new product varieties that are decreasingly valued by the 
consumers? 
This paper discusses this theoretical research question focusing on the empirical caveat of 
the U.S. footwear industry’s organization. Concretely, we ask whether the change in the 
demand character due to functional satiation effects in this market influences the 
observed separation of manufacturing and product innovation, because both phenomena 
occur in parallel in the U.S. footwear market. Drawing on Christensen’s (1997) notion of 
“performance oversupply” and its formalization of by Adner and Levinthal (2001), we 
argue that functional satiation effects change the nature of market demand. Thereby, the 
nature of competition in the market changes which in turn has implications for its 
industrial and corporate organization. This argument is complemented by a discussion of 
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draws on Frenzel Baudisch (2006a; 2006b).  
In order to empirically substantiating our argument, we conduct a case study analysis into 
the historical development of the U.S. footwear industry; we review how this industry has 
developed to be ‘Schumpeter’s exemplar case’ in the first half of the 20
th century and 
then how its value chain disintegrates in the 1970s and 1980s and how it is organized 
today. The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, our theoretical 
argumentation is outlined. Section 3 delivers the case study of the historical development 
of the U.S. footwear industry. The discussion of the case study’s findings follows in 
section 4 and section 5 offers concludes.  
II.  VARIETY OVERSUPPLY, MARKET COMPETITION, AND 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
This section argues that a market’s functional satiation affects its industrial organization, 
in particular the separation of manufacturing and product innovation. We take two 
complementing approaches to make the argument. First, a phenomenological description 
of satiation effects as a change in the parameterization of demand lies the basis for our 
argument (cf. Adner & Levinthal, 2001). Nevertheless, this approach does not inquire 
into the actual changes of consumer behaviors. Second, an inquiry into the motivations of 
consumers to buy products beyond their functional requirements complements the first 
approach (cf. Frenzel Baudisch, 2006b). Discussing the consumers’ motivations to buy 
products beyond their functional requirements offers a deeper qualitative understanding 
of the business practices to be revealed in the historical case of the U.S. footwear 
industry. 
The first approach to our argument draws on Adner and Levinthal (2001). The main 
question is how much do the decreasing marginal utility and the resulting higher price 
sensitivity – that consumers attribute to oversupplied product varieties after their 
functional satiation – affect the organization of production and innovation. In the growth 
regime of variety oversupply, firms can less and less avoid price competition by 
differentiating their products, because the consumers’ marginal utility of more product 
variety is decreasing. Firms compete more and more in terms of product innovation 
competition  and cost competition at the same time. As the marginal utility for the 
functional improvements decreases beyond functional satiation, firms cannot reap 
temporary monopoly rents from product innovations anymore. Product innovation 
becomes a mere necessary condition to consumption growth
3. Smaller and fast changing 
batch sizes must be made possible by flexible production processes, as well as continuous 
cost reductions in production are necessary in order to compete in such markets, in which 
consumers buy beyond their functional requirements. 
The second approach to our argument about the effect of market satiation on industrial 
organizations is founded on the analysis of consumer motivations to buy beyond 
                                                 
3 Functional complementarities between new products might postpone satiation effects (Christensen, 
1997, pp.179), e.g., between computer soft- and hardware. For the sake of our argument we abstract from 
such complementarities. In the case of shoe consumption, such functional complementarities can be 
assumed to be of marginal importance.  
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motivations arising from social interactions between consumers become more important 
for the growth of consumption of oversupplied product varieties. Several motivational 
processes arise from social comparisons that affect market demand, but abstract from 
functional advancements of products (Frank, 1985; Vermeir, van Kenhove, & Hendrickx, 
2002; Karlsson, Dellgran, Klingander, & Gärling, 2004; Frenzel Baudisch, 2006a; 
2006b). It is the increasing importance of social interactions between consumers for the 
growth of demand like status effects, herd behavior, and fashion cycles that continuously 
decrease the predictability of demand in terms of product functionality. This increases the 
uncertainty of demand from the perspective of a supplier who exclusively focuses on 
product functionalities. Thus, suppliers must increase their ability to react to this 
uncertain demand by reducing lead times of production and increasing the flexibility of 
their production’s batch size.  
In order to develop implications for industrial organization from this section’s 
argumentative sketches about satiation effects and market competition, we sketch out 
what determines the governance structures of value chains in the next section. Having 
done so, we relate the outlined arguments to these determinants and, thereby, develop 
implications for the industrial organization from the occurrence of functional satiation 
effects.  
1.  The governance of global value chain 
This section briefly reviews recent works of Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005) on 
the determinants of the governance structures in global value chains. In its most basic 
form, a value-added chain is “the process by which technology is combined with material 
and labor inputs, and then processed inputs are assembled, marketed, and distributed. A 
single firm may consist of only one link in this process, or it may be extensively 
vertically integrated ...” (Kogut, 1985, p. 15). The key issues in this literature are which 
activities and technologies a firm keeps in-house and which should be outsourced to other 
firms, and where the various activities should be located. The vertical integration or de-
integration of production, product design, and marketing is not reported in industry 
concentration indexes, firm sizes, or reports about market shares. Rather than analyzing 
the relationship between market concentration or firm size and innovative activity in a 
market, we want to analyze the degree of vertical integration of processes within the 
firms of an industry. Value chain analysis is able to analyze such structures; this is why 
we choose this method for our case study in order to go beyond the usual analyses that 
have been led by Schumpeter’s hypothesis. 
Having laid out a taxonomy of governance structure of value chains, Gereffi et al. (2005, 
pp. 84) developed an operational theory of such structures. They theorize about why 
different governance structures arise in global value chains under which conditions. They 
identify and discuss three key determinants of value chain governance patterns: The 
complexity of transactions; the codifiability of information; and the capability of 
suppliers. In so doing, they acknowledge the problem of asset specificity as identified by 
transaction cost economics, but also give emphasis to what they term ‘mundane’ 
transaction costs – the costs involved in coordinating activities along the chain. It has 
been argued that these coordination, or mundane, transaction costs rise when value chains 
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products whose output is time sensitive (Baldwin & Clark, 2000).  
Gereffi (1999) identifies two different governance forms of value chains on the basis of 
rents (broadly defined as returns from scarce assets) that the lead firms reap. The 
distinction relies on main tasks, challenges, and competences of the lead firms, i.e., the 
most important and profitable nodes in value chain. Producer-driven value chains where 
producers reap technology rents, i.e., from their ability to introduce technological product 
or process innovations. Buyer-driven value chains where buyers, i.e., retailers and 
merchandisers, reap mostly organization rents, i.e., from their ability to organize the 
disintegrated production process in smooth and efficient ways, without owning 
production capacities. The separation of product innovation and manufacturing is 
essentially described by the distinction of value chains into those that are buyer- vs. those 
that are producer-driven.  
In terms of Gereffi et al.’s (2005) analysis of determinants of the governance structure of 
value chains, a producer-driven value chain is characterized by a high complexity of 
transaction. This is based in the high complexity of products and production processes 
that usually stems from the close relation of production technology and product 
technology. In such producer-driven value chains, this in turn results in high specificity of 
firms’ assets and a low codifiability of such complex transactions. In addition to the 
difficulties of codifying, the willingness to codify transactions for uses outside the firms 
is low, because firms want to appropriate their product and production technology that 
are the basis for their profits. The capabilities of outside suppliers are low as a result of 
this complexity of transactions and their low codifiability, and because producers have 
little incentive to develop their suppliers’ capabilities in this situation.  
A buyer-driven value chain is characterized by the lead firms reaping rents from their 
capabilities to organize the modular value chain, not by producing themselves (Gereffi et 
al., 2005). The lead firms are developing and marketing new products and they usually 
distribute and sell them to the consumers, as well as they organize the value chain as 
demand is time sensitive. Production is outsourced to firms that are usually located in 
low-wage countries. The supplier base is well developed, transactions are relatively easy 
to be codified, but nevertheless complex, i.e., the organization of the transactions within 
the value chain is complex. In turn, the codifiability of transactions also depends on the 
capabilities of the supply base, i.e., the extent to which the actual producers can guarantee 
product quality and timing. The ability to organize transactions with respect to product 
quality and innovation timing is the basis for the profits of the lead firms. Due to 
shortening innovation cycles, the actual producers operate small batch size with flexible 
production processes. In several industries production becomes less mechanized and 
more ‘humanized’ to make production processes ever more flexible. The first modular 
and buyer-driven value chains emerged in industries where labor-intensive production 
was outsourced to low-wage countries, the apparel and footwear industry. 
Looking broadly at the evidence provided by global value chain research across a variety 
of industries and time periods, Gereffi et al. (2005, pp.96) are ‘tempted’ to make 
generalizations about trends in the global economy. In all of the case studies they present, 
and many others as well, increasing capabilities in the supply base have helped to push 
the architecture of global value chains away from producer-driven toward more buyer-
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buyer-driven chain – seems to be especially likely when suppliers offer buyers, i.e., the 
lead firms, greater levels of value chain bundling (e.g., turn-key and full-package 
services), which has the advantages of internalizing tacit knowledge and pooling capacity 
utilization for greater economies of scale. However, organizational fragmentation will not 
lead to value chain modularity if codification is extremely difficult. For example, a strong 
shift toward fragmentation in the organization of the U.S. motor vehicle industry 
beginning in the mid-1980s has resulted in value chains with strong relational elements. 
This can be partly explained by the difficulty of codifying complex mechanical systems, 
which has inhibited the rise of industry-wide standards and kept the complexity of the 
transactions between lead firms and suppliers high even as the capabilities of suppliers, 
driven in part by the consolidation of first tier suppliers, has increased dramatically (cf. 
Gereffi et al., 2005, pp.96). 
2.  Functional demand satiation and industry dynamics 
In this section we argue that functional satiation effects in a market increase the trend 
towards a lesser degree of explicit coordination and power asymmetry in its industry’s 
value chains that is driven by the increase of supplier capabilities.  
The basic argument is that the simultaneous competition based on innovation and prices 
in a market beyond functional satiation privileges modular, buyer-driven value chains 
over other governance types. In a nutshell, more functionally complex products tend to 
lead to more vertical integration of production processes, i.e., a high degree of explicit 
coordination within the value chain. Price-quantity competition among producers of 
relatively homogeneous goods tends to be fought in a market setting with no or very little 
explicit coordination between producers and buyers in a value chain. If a market is both 
driven by innovation and price competition, the degree of explicit coordination has to be 
higher than for homogenous, hence less innovative products, but the price competition 
leads to an outsourcing of production processes in order to simultaneously attain 
production economies: A modular value chain emerges.  
The phenomenological analysis of functional demand satiation 
Functional satiation decreases the marginal utility attributed to new product varieties. 
(Christensen, 1997, ch.8; Adner et al., 2001). Adner and Levinthal (2001) show that the 
oversupply of product varieties can expand the market beyond a market’s functional 
satiation if product prices decline simultaneously to the performance oversupply. The 
next paragraphs translate the implications of Adner and Levinthal’s model into Gereffi et 
al.’s (2005) framework of industrial organization. The concrete question is how do firms 
organize the oversupply of product innovations when simultaneously reducing costs in 
manufacturing. Put differently, we ask what is the most important capability suppliers 
must have to grow in a market beyond functional satiation, as opposed to a market where 
innovation allows producers to reap temporary monopoly rents. 
Beyond functional satiation the decreasing marginal utility for product variety 
emphasizes cost competition in addition to innovation competition. Thereby, the 
economies of scale and scope in manufacturing become necessary, while innovation 
competition decreases batch sizes and, thereby, economies of scale. This increases the 
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production technologies become increasing necessary for cost reductions given small 
batch sizes. Human labor (re)gains importance in the production processes due to its 
extreme flexibility opposed to product-specific mass production facilities. The 
importance of labor costs drives the re-location of such production processes to low-wage 
countries. The lower the price of the end product, the faster this re-location process, as 
high investments into flexible production technologies are less of viable solution to the 
competitive situation of variety oversupply. The more complex and costly the products, 
the more investments into flexible production technologies are viable.  
If the economies within the processes of product innovation and manufacturing are 
separable, the competitive situation in a market beyond functional satiation should lead to 
this separation. The argument is that if these economies are separable they are likely to be 
better achieved in separate firms. Nevertheless, this implies that that cost reductions 
become so important that the appropriation of product technology becomes negligible, 
because the product innovators give out the product technology to the actual producer for 
them to manufacture the product. This separation as such poses the question about how 
this neglect of the appropriation of product technology becomes possible. Seemingly, the 
product technology, i.e. performance or quality improvements, is not the most important 
market driver anymore. This implies that innovative capacity is not founded within the 
manufacturing capacity. 
Gereffi et al.’s (2005) framework indicates that for the separation of product innovation 
and manufacturing to occur, the ability to codify transactions within the value chain has 
to go up. However, the decreasing marginal utility attributed to new product varieties 
beyond functional satiation does not  imply that the codifiability of these transaction 
increases. Independent of the degree of the codifiability of transactions, the question 
remains why product developers can resign from appropriating their product technologies 
against the manufacturing firms.  
Gereffi et al.’s (2005) empirical case studies show that scale effects in product innovation 
within R&D departments seem to be separate from economies in manufacturing. 
Nevertheless, Gereffi et al. (2005) do no elaborate why product developers deliberately 
do not appropriate their technology; or why the actual producers do not directly enter the 
final consumer market bypassing the product designers. The argument that has been 
developed on the basis of the works of Adner and Levinthal (2001) is that market 
competition beyond functional satiation is simultaneously based on prices and varieties; 
industries organize in ways to reap economies in product innovation and manufacturing 
at the same time and this means in different organizations, i.e., in separate firms. 
Nevertheless, the appropriability question relating to the separation of product innovation 
and manufacturing is not yet answered by this argumentation. Besides the appropriability 
question there are other issues to be addressed in the context of the separation of product 
innovation and manufacturing, e.g., the lead firms’ foci on distribution channels and 
branding (cf. Gereffi, 1999). In order to address these issues, we inquire deeper into the 
consumers’ motivations to buy beyond their functional requirements.  
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Given the separation of product innovation and manufacturing in several industries, the 
question remains why there is no entry to the final consumer market by the actual 
producers, because they control the product technology and the production technology. 
Seemingly, the actual producers cannot innovate the product technology on their own, as 
the sources of innovation have shifted from the production process to marketing 
activities, such as design, branding, and distribution. Nevertheless, the decrease of the 
marginal utility attributed to advances in product functionalities, can be interpreted in two 
ways. Either product innovation processes are now ‘easier’, because the demand for new 
products is less and less driven by the advancements of the product technologies. Or 
product innovation becomes ‘more difficult’, because radical product innovations are 
needed to drive market growth beyond functional satiation. In either case the product 
manufactures should have the opportunity to create new products and enter the end 
market as they possess the production facility and the ability to functionally innovate. 
Seemingly, the phenomenological characterization of the demand side as showing a 
decreasing marginal utility is not sufficient to addresses these issues.  
Motivations of consumers to buy products beyond their functional requirements arise 
increasingly from social comparisons among consumers (Frenzel Baudisch, 2006b). 
Frenzel Baudisch (2006b) tests this theoretical account with time-series data on U.S. 
footwear consumption, so that his paper analyzing the demand side of the U.S. footwear 
market is perfectly complementing the present paper analyzing its supply side. Frenzel 
Baudisch (2006b) shows that when social motivations predominantly drive consumption 
growth, that product functionality is less important to the consumers. Herd behavior, 
status consumption, and fashion cycles as outcomes of social comparison processes 
between consumers, therefore, increase the uncertainty of demand with respect to 
functional characteristics of products. Frenzel Baudisch (2006b) cites several studies that 
emphasis the importance of fashion and status consumption in the U.S. footwear market 
since the 1970s (cf. Weisskoff, 1994; Freeman & Kleiner, 1998).  
We have argued that demand beyond functional satiation that is generated by consumer 
herding or status considerations is uncertain with respect to the functionality of products. 
Functional demand uncertainty leads to market situations where 10 to 25 percent of the 
new product varieties generate 75 to 90 percent of firms’ profits from new products (cf. 
Redmond, 1995; Poolton & Barclay, 1998). We hold that demand beyond functional 
satiation is increasingly motivated by social interactions among consumers, and, thus, 
becomes more uncertain. This is because social motivational processes among consumers 
must be classified as indeterminate with respect to the product functionality, e.g. herd 
behavior (cf. Rook, 2006 for a survey on herd behavior). The ability of suppliers to react 
quickly to such unforeseeable demand shifts is essential for competitive position (cf. 
Fisher & Raman, 1996; Randall, Morgan, & Morton, 2003; O'Marah, 2005). In order to 
increase their reagility in the face of such demand shifts we argue that suppliers have to 
reduce their lead times, i.e., shortening the time interval between the initiation and the 
completion of a production process.  
The generation of ever new product varieties at decreasing prices is the necessary 
condition to compete in a market beyond functional satiation, but we hold that the 
commensurate condition is the ability to deal with the increasing demand uncertainty by 
  8reducing lead times. The demand side selects a small number of products to diffuse and 
become economically successful from the oversupplied, larger variety of new products; 
while the rest of the oversupplied product variety does not become a successful 
innovation. The amount of time between the placing of an order and the receipt of the 
goods ordered becomes essential to supply more quantities of the new successful 
varieties. Business researchers and practitioners stress that the reduction of lead times 
implies the control and the optimization of the whole value chain without necessarily 
owning the involved facilities (e.g. Fisher et al., 1996; Gereffi, 1999; Randall et al., 2003; 
Gereffi et al., 2005; O'Marah, 2005). The value chain must therefore be managed by the 
lead firm. Furthermore, lead time reduction should be deeply integrated into the 
innovation processes of firms (cf. Tomas & Hult, 2003; Sheffi, 2005). 
So, the lead firms need the capabilities to produce ever new product varieties and to react 
to the diffusion of only a more or less arbitrary selection of these new products. 
Consequently, there is no need to appropriate product technology, because the products’ 
functionality is less and less the basis of their economic success, i.e. this arbitrary 
selection by consumers. The codification of transaction increases, because the willingness 
to codify increases. Products can become less functionally complex, as producers learn to 
create herd behaviors with technologically simple goods. Then, the decreasing functional 
complexity of new products is a second reason for the increased codifiability of 
transactions.  
The reduction of lead times increases the firms’ ability to react to demand uncertainty, 
moreover, the identification and the creation of a consumer herd are essential capabilities 
to compete in markets beyond functional satiation. Sales data from distribution channels 
about the early sales of a new generation of products are the basis for any reaction to a 
demand shift to a small variety of products, i.e., the consumers’ selection of the a 
successful innovation to be diffused. Distribution channels are therefore at the core of the 
needed capabilities of the lead firms, because a supplier has to control and optimize the 
distribution channels to reduce the time-to-market of a new product and also because they 
provide that information to react to the market’s selections in the first place, i.e., by 
providing early sales data about which new product will be successful innovations and 
which will be a failure. In addition, stable distribution channels also take up the habits of 
consumers to shop in unchanging places, in an otherwise changing, i.e., innovative 
market. 
The branding of products is an important capability of firms to compete in a market 
beyond functional satiation. Information economics shows that a brand signals 
continuously high product quality, i.e., a brand reduces the uncertainty of the consumers. 
Because herd behavior results from consumer uncertainty (cf. Rook, 2006), it can be 
initiated by signaling and branding. Branding is also important to signal social status. 
Branding and marketing in general create the social awareness for a new product that is 
the basis for the social comparison processes within an consumer population that 
motivate the diffusion of this innovation. Branding and other marketing communications 
therefore are essential for the stimulation of social comparison processes that motivate 
consumption beyond functional satiation. 
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Here, we will propose that a firm needs certain capabilities in order to compete in a 
market beyond functional satiation that are different from those needed in a market where 
products are primarily bought for their functionality. Consumption growth beyond 
functional satiation relies on the oversupply of product variety at decreasing prices. We 
have argued that the capability of create ever new product varieties with declining costs is 
the founded on the separation of the processes of product innovation and manufacturing; 
because production is outsourced to firms that are usually located in low-wage countries. 
Demand becomes more uncertainty as functional satiation renders the product technology 
less and less important for selling the product. We have argued that aggregate demand 
become more uncertain with respect to product functionalities, because it is social 
comparison processes among consumers that motivate consumption beyond their 
functional requirements. Such social interactions can result in herd behavior, fashion 
cycles, and status consumption. We have argued that a successful firms has to be able to 
quickly react to such indeterminate demand shifts. Therefore, the organization of the 
complete value chain is essential to the firm in order to reduce lead times to compete in 
such uncertain markets. Furthermore, firms have to focus on distribution and branding to 
identify and stimulate such social comparison processes and thereby generate demand. To 
sum up, the functional satiation of a market fosters the separation of product innovation 
and manufacturing. The separation is not hindered by the need to appropriate product 
technology as firms reap organizational rents from their capability to reduce lead times in 
their modular value chain and from marketing the products, rather than rents from 
technological advances of products and production processes.  
Proposition: In a market that continuously grows beyond functional satiation 
due to an oversupply of product varieties, its maturing industry decreases its the 
degree of explicit coordination and power asymmetry within its value chain. 
Lead firms reap rents from their capabilities to organize the modular value 
chain, not by producing themselves. The lead firms are developing and 
marketing new products and they usually distribute and sell them to the 
consumer.  
The next section explores the historical development of the U.S. footwear industry in 
order to find qualitative evidence that either substantiates or rejects this proposition. 
III.  THE DYNAMICS OF THE U.S. FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY 
The historical development of the U.S. footwear industry is divided into time periods, 
during which the value chain was relatively homogeneous and stable. There are however 
transition phases between these phases of stability. These stable periods are delimited by 
a particular organizational form that is dominating in the U.S. footwear industry, for 
example before the invention of machine tools for footwear production shoes were 
produced by small craftsmen’s workshops all over the USA. Using Gereffi et al.’s (2005) 
analytic framework of production organization, a period of one dominant organizational 
form is determined by one node being the core of the value chain. The core of a value 
chain holds the lead firms as it is the most profitable node that is usually characterized by 
a high degree of monopoly power. The monopoly/market power of the lead firm(s) in the 
core node stretches up- and downward in the value chain. The criterion that indicates a 
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from one node to another – for example from the actual production to the provision of 
production technology in the industrial revolution since the 1850s.  
1.  The U.S. footwear industry before 1899 
The history of footwear goes back many thousands of years. Early footwear undoubtedly 
grew out of the necessity to provide protection when moving over rough terrain in 
varying weather conditions. Initially, footwear was probably made of plaited grass or 
rawhide held to the foot with thongs. Soon the rich and influential began distinguishing 
themselves by the craftsmanship and decoration, which characterized their shoes.  
In the colonial days, if a U.S. family lived in a rural area, as most did, they were visited 
about once a year by itinerant shoemakers. The shoemaker would stay tow or more days 
making shoes for the family. There were no ready made shoes. Individual cobblers 
working either alone or with one or two apprentices or journeymen produced practically 
all shoes. The goal of every apprentice cobbler was to learn how to make an entire shoe 
as soon as possible. In the shoemaking shops in the cities you haggled about price by the 
inch (Rossi, 1988, pp. 1). 
Nothing much changed until 1750 when the first “assembly line” shoemaking in Lynn, 
Massachusetts was established. All shoes were still made entirely by hand, but each 
shoemaker specialized in one task in production process. With the ready-made shoes 
there was not the vaguest semblance of shoe sizes. The shoes came in two lengths, long 
and short, and two widths, fat and slim. The U.S. shoe market experienced enormous 
growth in the late 1850s with the world’s first machine-made shoes. Sewing machines for 
uppers and soles were the catalysts of this growth. For footwear, this was the industrial 
revolution. By 1870s, shoe manufacturing was America’s largest industry and largest 
employer (Hazard, 1913; Mulligan Jr., 1981). 
There were other important parts of the industrial revolution during this period. The first 
left and right shoes were introduced for soldiers, a great – some argue crucial – aid for the 
Union’s troops their long marches during the civil war. Up to then, almost all footwear 
was mad on “straight” lasts for the economic reason that they could be worn on either 
foot and thus required only one last instead of a pair to make them (Rossi, 1988, p. 4).  
New shoemaking was advancing was advancing at a rapid rate. Between 1865 and 1900 
hundreds of new shoemaking machines, methods, and components were invented and 
applied. It was the glory era of American shoemaking: In 1870, there were 7,570 
tanneries in the U.S. (compared to 100 in 1988). The combined shoe and leather 
manufacturing industry was the country’s largest, and by 1910 two of the ten largest 
corporations were tanners (Rossi, 1988, p. 5) 
2.  The United Shoe Machinery Company and its global monopoly, 1899-1953 
In 1899, the United Shoe Machinery Company (U.S.M.C.) merged the interests of five 
shoe-machinery manufacturers, of whom three were the dominant companies in the 
principal shoe-machinery groups at the time. From the beginning on, the U.S.M.C. 
provided machines for the complete production process from cutting to sewing. At the 
time of the merge the U.S.M.C. controlled the major share of its market, ca. 70% or 
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growth raised it to the level of about 85% of the market, at which figure it stabilized 
(Roe, 1914; Kaysen, 1956; Clark, 1957).  
From 1900 onwards, shoe machinery all over the world came to be dominated by the 
U.S.M.C. This is a tribute to the force of the idea created by the men who in 1899 set up 
the U.S.M.C merger. The system of control over the shoe industry, which they set up to 
give them the power to work out their ideas was the so-called “tied lease” system. The 
U.S.M.C did not sell its streak of machines to the shoe manufacturer, it leased them to 
him. In the tied-lease system the shoe manufacturer had to use all of the U.S.M.C. 
machines for his complete production process and no others. The stringency of this 
system was relaxed in America in 1915, that is to say the tying clauses were removed by 
a law suit against the U.S.M.C. One of the results of the leasing system was that the shoe 
industry has been serviced with machines in better order, better maintained than is the 
case in similar industries where outright purchase is the rule. (Kaysen, 1956) 
One use of the U.S.M.C made of its market power was to set up a first-class research 
organization (Hoover Jr., 1933; 1937). It appears that the use of this research organization 
to improve the machines, on which the dominance of the U.S.M.C. based, was one of the 
main factors in the retaining its position through the first part of the 20
th century. The 
application of the efforts of R&D to the shoe industry has naturally been controlled by the 
commercial policy of the U.S.M.C. There are indications that the smallness of size and 
the lack of growth in the shoe-manufacturing industry has restrained somewhat the 
U.S.M.C.’s research organization from working out and applying revolutionary concepts 
(Miranda, 2004).  
Under the various anti-trust laws the United States fought three cases against the 
U.S.M.C. First, in 1911 on general monopoly grounds; the United States lost this case. 
Second, in 1915 to break the tied-lease system outlined above; in this case the United 
States won. Then, third in 1953, United States won allowing shoe manufacturers to buy 
their shoe machines as an alternatives to leasing, and to release shoe manufacturers from 
the obligation to employ U.S.M.C. operatives for maintaining their leased machines 
(Clark, 1957).  
The international dominance of the U.S.M.C. 
Miranda (2004) analyses the so-called ‘American invasion of Europe’ and its effects on 
the global footwear industry. Special attention is paid to the technological transfer of the 
U.S.M.C. to Europe. He shows that the American exporting success story was directly 
linked to the technological gap that opened up between the American and European 
industries; the modernization of the European footwear industry, and the subsequent 
improvement in its competitiveness, was mainly a result of the technology transfer from 
the U.S.A. The United Shoe Machinery Company becomes a multinational company by 
its technology transfer to Europe; this is a key factor in speeding up the diffusion of 
innovations within the European industry; and the adoption of the new technologies and 
the speed and scope of this adoption have not been due as much to the ‘technological 
capabilities’ of each country as to the profitability that the companies managed to gain 
from these innovations (Miranda, 2004). 
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by 1910: In the United States more than 90% of all machinery operated in shoemaking 
was built and maintained by the United Shoe Machinery Company. In the United 
Kingdom, 80% of the machinery came from the U.S.M.C., over 75% in France and 90% 
in Italy. In Scandinavia and Austria-Hungry over 60% of the shoemakers were using 
American machines. Only in Germany, the national machine tool makers were still 
dominant, and the U.S.M.C. held only 30% of the market. These German were however 
mainly imitating U.S. patents that were not protected in Germany. 
The U.S.M.C. is a Schumpeterian exemplar case 
The U.S.M.C. was the dominant machine tool maker for the U.S. footwear market in the 
first half of the 20
th century. Its dominance of the U.S. market led to scale effects that the 
U.S.M.C. transformed into technological advances by consequent research and 
development. It was this technological advantage that allowed the U.S.M.C to dominate 
the global market. As such, the U.S.M.C. is the Schumpeterian exemplar firm 
(Schumpeter, 1939, pp. 391): The monopoly in the USA, the biggest national market, 
allowed it to be more innovative than any other firm in its global market (cf. Hoover Jr., 
1933; 1937; Miranda, 2004). 
















The leasing arrangements that the U.S.M.C. held with its clients installed a severe 
competition in the subsequent production processes. The U.S.M.C did not offer any scale 
promotion, i.e. cheaper prices for bigger clients, which further promoted competition 
among shoemakers. Labor costs were competitive, as the production technology was 
easily accessible and were leased with little risk for the producers, which made entry into 
the market easy. Figure 1 visualizes the value chain of U.S. and global footwear industry 
dominated by the U.S.M.C. With the breaking of the U.S.M.C.’s leasing system in 1953 
this particular organization of the value chain for the U.S. footwear market starts 
changing dramatically. 
  133.  Industrial dynamics in the U.S. footwear market 
In order to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of the governance structure in the 
footwear value chain, we need to take a closer look at the U.S. retail sector. Then, the 
decline of the U.S. footwear industry is analyzed. Seemingly, changes in America’s 
consumption patterns are one of the main factors that have given rise to flexible 
specialization in global manufacturing. 
Dynamics in the retailing sector 
The steadily increasing importance of fashion changes in shoes brought many problems 
to the shoe industry in the 1910s and 1920s. Hoover (1933) emphasizes the most 
significant effects for the location of production sites: “speed and easy contact in 
marketing” (ibid., p.269). With the occurrence of mass fashion in the 1920s shoe retailers 
become more and more important for this market. Some degree of vertical integration 
was achieved between the manufacturer and retailer, and these gave rise to the brand-
name shoe store. The effects of this three-tiered market structure – monopoly by the 
machine producer, competition in manufacturing, and high concentration in retailing – 
was to set the stage for two major antitrust suits which upset the arrangements at both 
ends, in 1953 for the U.S.M.C. and 1962 for the retailing sector (cf. Kaysen, 1956; 
Peterman, 1975).  
A comprehensive study of U.S. department stores showed that the structure of the 
industry became more oligopolistic during the 1960s and 1970s as giant department 
stores swallowed up many once-prominent independent retailers (Bluestone, Hanna, 
Kuhn, & Moore, 1981). The growth of large firms at the expense of small retail outlets 
was encouraged by several forces, including economies of scale, the advances in 
technology, mainly information technology, and mass advertising available to retail 
giants, government regulation, and the financial backing of large corporate parent firms. 
Ironically, despite the department store industry’s transformation into a oligopoly, the 
price competition between giant retailers became more intense, not less (Bluestone et al., 
1981, p. 2)
4  
In the 1980s, the department store in turn came under siege. In their heyday, department 
stores were quintessential middle-class American institutions
5. These retailers offered a 
broad selection of general merchandise for “family shopping,” with “the mother as 
‘generalist’ buying for other family members” (Legomsky, 1986, p. R62)
6 While this 
                                                 
4 Enhanced price competition is compatible with oligopoly because the economies of scale and scope of 
large-volume discount chains lead to high concentration levels in the retail sector, at the same time as the 
discounters stimulate considerable price competition because of their low-income consumer base.  
5 Many department stores carry familiar household names: Macy’s, Bloomingdale’s, Jordan Marsh, 
Mervyn’s, Nordstrom, Dillard, Filene’s, Kaufmann’s, Saks Fith Avenue. Numerous American retail chains 
today are owned by holding companies, such as the May Department Store Company, Federated 
Department Stores, and Dayton Hudson. In Europe, where consumers were more inclined to shuttle from 
store to store for their individual apparel and footwear needs, these department stores never developed into 
the prominent retailing institution that it has in the mass market of the United States.  
6 General merchandise retailers provide a broad selection of “soft goods” (including apparel, footwear, 
and home furniture) and “hard goods” (appliances, hardware, auto, and garden supplies, etc.). 
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income, in 1990 less than 10 percent of American households fitted that description. In 
the 1990s, the generalist strategy no longer worked. The one shopper per family of the 
1970s became many different shoppers, with each member of the family constituting a 
separate buying unit (Sack, 1989). 
The breakup of the American mass market into distinct, if overlapping, retail 
constituencies created a competitive squeeze on the traditional department stores and 
mass merchandisers
7, who were caught between a wide variety of speciality stores, on the 
one hand, and large-volume discount chains, on the other
8. The former, who tailored 
themselves to the upscale shopper, offered costumers an engaging ambience, strong 
fashion statements, and good service; the latter who aimed for the lower income buyer, 
emphasized low prices, convenience, and no-frills merchandise.  
Analyzing the footwear and apparel value chains, Gereffi (1999), Korzeniewicz (1992; 
1994), and Schmitz and Knorringa (2000) provide qualitative and quantitative overviews 
about the retailing sector in the 1990s. Unlike the earlier “retail revolution” when 
department stores formed oligopolies in the 1960s/70s, the 1990s saw a surge of 
speciality and discount formats. Furthermore, the retail stores went either upscale or low-
price, leaving the middle segment in terms quality and price. 
Department stores and other merchandisers in the U.S. tried to develop effective 
counterstrategies to these trends. Department stores simulated speciality stores through 
the creation of “store-within-a-store” boutiques, each accommodating a particular 
company (like Liz Claiborne, Calvin Klein, Tony Hilfinger, or Hugo Boss) or a distinct 
set of fashion tastes. Similarly, Woolworth Corporation shed its mass merchandising 
image by incorporating dozens of speciality formats in its portfolio of 6,500 stores, 
including Foot Locker, Champs Sports, Afterthoughts accessories, and The San Francisco 
Music Box Co. In 1993, speciality stores accounted for about half of Woolworth’s annual 
revenue, up from 29% in 1983 (Miller, 1993).  
Some retailers like J.C. Penney sought to upgrade their status from mass merchandisers to 
department stores by adding higher-priced products, and to increase profitability by 
emphasizing higher-margin merchandise that had a faster turn-around time (Sack, 1989, 
p. R80). Other firms began to diversify their appeal by establishing their own speciality 
retail outlets (like the Foot Locker stores, which are owned by the Woolworth 
Corporation). On the international front, retailers and manufacturers, alike were acquiring 
large importers to shore up their position in global sourcing networks, For example, 
                                                 
7 The best-known mass merchandising chains are Sears Roebuck & Co., Montgomery Ward, and 
Woolworth Corporation. These stores are a notch below the department stores in the quality of their 
merchandise and their prices, but they offer more service and brand-name variety than the large-volume 
discount retailers. In terms of their overall position in American retailing, though, department stores and 
mass merchandisers face similar competitive environments.  
8 The three most prominent discount chains today are Wal-Mart, Kmart, and Target. Discount chains may 
focus on a specific product, such as shoes, Payless ShoeSource, Pic’n’Pay, and the 550-store Fayva Shoes 
retail chain owned by Morse Shoe. Historically, discount retail chains differed from department stores 
because the former carried broader assortments of hard goods (auto accessories, gardening equipment, 
housewares) and they relied heavily on self-service. 
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Department Stores; and Meldiso, a division of Melville Corporation, handles 
international purchasing of shoes for Kmart. Pagoda Trading C., the second-biggest U.S. 
shoe importer in 1990, was acquired by the Brown Shoe Company, the largest U.S. 
footwear manufacturer. Unique organizational forms such as member-owned buyers or 
long-term contracts with other foreign traders are being used in overseas procurements 
since the 1990s (Cheng, 1996; 2001). 
The decline of the U.S. footwear industry 
Till the monopoly of the U.S.M.C. in 1953 was broken almost all shoes worn in the 
U.S.A. were domestic products (Weisskoff, 1994). Weisskoff (1994) analyzes the rise of 
shoe imports since the 1960s and the technological change in U.S. production. Freeman 
and Kleiner (1998) describe organizational changes of U.S. footwear producers under the 
competitive pressure of imports. Hufbauer et al. (1986) analyze the effect of quantitative 
import regulation for the U.S. footwear market between 1977 and 1981, which limited 
import quantities to protect domestic production. Several other authors focus on the 
globalization of footwear production, with a special focus on athletic footwear production 
since the late 1970s (cf. Hadjimichael, 1990; Donaghu et al., 1990; Frenkel, 2001). All 
studies about the supply side of the U.S. footwear market emphasis the increasing 
competitive pressure of imported shoes since the 1960s.  
Before 1960 the U.S. footwear demand was almost completed satisfied by domestic 
production. Till the late 1960s, U.S. footwear production was stable and the imported 
shoes increased the footwear market without driving out U.S. production. These imports 
till 1970 were mostly high-price shoes from Italy (Cheng, 1996). Beginning in the late 
1960s, imports from low-wage countries, especially Taiwan and South Korea, gained 
importance and by 1977 more than 50% of all imports came from Taiwan and South 
Korea. Comparing figures 2, 3 and 4, the increased growth of the U.S. footwear market 
since the mid1970s coincides with the decline of relative shoe prices. These cheaper 
imports were driving the U.S. production out of the market, cf. figure 4 (Weisskoff, 1994; 
Cheng, 1996; Freeman et al., 1998). 
In 1967 imports accounted for about 17% of footwear consumption, by 1977, imports 
gained more than 47% of the U.S. market. U.S. footwear producers called the 
government for protection. In 1977, a trade barrier was erected that limited import 
quantities of the main 'cheap' producing countries, Taiwan and South Korea (Hufbauer, 
Berliner, & Elliott, 1986). The importing countries were now motivated to scale up their 
product quality and prices to circumvent the quantity restriction. In this sense the trade 
barrier fostered innovation in footwear imports at a large scale. Increasing imports values 
and quantities during the trade protection resulted in its cancellation in 1981 (Hufbauer et 
al., 1986). 
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Figure 3: Consumer Price Indexes, USA, 1930-2002 (Bureau of 
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Accelerating product variety driving market growth 
The U.S. footwear industry declined while the U.S. footwear consumption was increasing 
faster than income since the 1970s, cf. figure 2 and 4. The cheaper footwear imports to 
drive out more expensive domestic production, cf. 3 and 4, but consumer are 
overcompensating the price decline by buying larger quantities of shoes per year per 
capita, cf. figures 2 and 3, so that overall shoe consumption grew and has been growing 
faster then income since the 1970s, cf. figure 2 and 4. The question is why U.S. 
production declined in this fast growing market since the 1970s? 
The income elasticity for footwear expenditure changed in the 1970s (Frenzel Baudisch, 
2006b): Before 1970 the growth of U.S. footwear market had been smaller than that of 
personal income, since 1970 it has been larger, as the increasing share of personal income 
spent on footwear indicates, cf. figure 2. The share of footwear consumption of total 
income has a global minimum in the early 1970s. The empirical studies of the U.S. 
footwear market made before this change in this change in income elasticity by Szeliski 
and Paradiso (1936) and Mack (1956) naturally classify shoes as normal goods. The time 
between the world wars was characterized by unstable economic development and 
fluctuating incomes in the USA. Mack (1956) analyzes shoe consumption in these times 
and shows that income was the dominant determinant of shoe consumption: The footwear 
market was not growing, rather oscillating till the end of World War II. After 1945, the 
U.S. footwear consumption was increasing, but at smaller rate than per capita income. 
Kim (2003) analyzes aggregate U.S. demand of clothes and shoes between 1929 and 
1994 and finds structural change in consumer behavior for clothes and shoes in 1970. 
Since 1970s consumers have been buying increasing quantities of shoes 
overcompensating the decline of prices that results from imports; this made the U.S. 
footwear market an “luxury” category as it has growing faster than overall income. 
Weiskoff (1994) points out that shoes are 'necessities' before 1970 and are 'luxury' goods 
afterwards. Nevertheless, the U.S. footwear industry declined in this growing market.  
  18Since the mid1970s, the growth of U.S. footwear market, that characterizes shoes as 
luxury product category, is driven by continuous innovation accompanied by a falling 
relative price level (Frenzel Baudisch, 2006b). Weisskoff (1994, p. 59) emphasizes the 
appearance of ‘revolutions’ in materials, design, production techniques, and marketing of 
imported shoes in the 1970s, but domestically produced shoes were not very innovative. 
Weisskoff (1994: 67) holds that the market for these shoes is increasing because shoes 
changed from being “necessary” to “luxury” due to changes in the “American life style”, 
i.e. a change in consumer behaviors. Frenzel Baudisch (2006b) explains this change as he 
shows that aggregate consumer behavior since the 1970s is less motivated by product 
functionalities and more by social comparison processes: The ‘oversupply’ of product 
varieties at decreasing prices is driving demand beyond the functional requirements of 
consumers. Figure 5 shows the strong and sustained increase in product variety since the 
1970s, which is proxied by trademark registrations in the U.S. footwear market. Frenzel 
Baudisch (2006b) statistically explains the increase in the income elasticity in U.S. 
footwear consumption (figure 2) by this increase in product innovation (figure 5) and the 
decrease in relative shoe prices (figure 3).  
Figure 5: Trademark registrations in the U.S. footwear market, 1900-2003 (United States 
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As the market has been driven by simultaneous innovation and price competition, but 
U.S. production declines in this growing market, we presume that the U.S. footwear 
production was not able to produce at low prices and to be innovative at the same time. 
Freeman and Kleiner (1998, p. 27) show that U.S. footwear manufacturers were only able 
to survive the competitive pressure from imports by concentrating "on high-quality niche 
production, producing many new styles" of shoes. They underline that economic success 
in the U.S. footwear market is immediately linked to a firm's ability to produce 
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organization and payment system. In this sense, the described importance of product 
innovation for consumption growth in the U.S. footwear market since the 1970s 
translated into the organizational structure of producers. 
So, paradoxically, in order to survive competitive price pressure from imports, U.S. 
footwear producers had to change to less cost-efficient, but more flexible and innovation-
friendly production organizations and compensation systems (Freeman et al., 1998). 
Concretely, all surviving U.S. footwear producers in the year 1994 had changed from 
piece-rate compensation systems for employees to time-rate compensation systems, 
which are less cost-efficient per product. Nevertheless, time-rate compensation is better 
suited for producing small batch sizes as product series change rapidly due to continuous 
product innovation. Piece-rate compensation actually creates diseconomies of learning 
when patch sizes are small, because of the unproductive early learning phases of the 
workers. Continued product innovations make price-rate compensation less cost-efficient. 
In other words, production based on piece-rate compensation of workers is more cost 
efficient with large batch sizes, but less suited for innovating firms. Time-rate 
compensation implies a more flexible, but less cost-efficient production organization, but 
allowed producers to introduce innovations at a high rate. 
In the year 1986 more than three quarters of the U.S. footwear producers were still 
compensating their workers based on innovation-unfriendly piece-rate systems 
(U.S.Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1987). This fact indicates that these 75% of U.S. 
footwear producers were following the strategy to predominantly reduce their costs to 
compete in the market. The few surviving U.S. footwear producers in 1994 analyzed by 
Freeman and Kleiner (1998) had deliberately chosen to have the cost disadvantage of 
time-rate compensation systems in order to have more flexible production systems that 
are better suited for innovations. The strategy to lower production costs by using piece-
rate compensation systems reduced the ability of U.S. producers to innovate. In addition, 
it is clear that production of labor-intensive goods based in the USA could not compete 
with production in low wage countries. Chinese footwear production, accounting for over 
85% of the U.S. consumption in 2001, has been organized with innovation-friendly time-
rate compensation ever since because in this way plant owners can easily employ 
unskilled labor (Frenkel, 2001).  
Given that foreign production can often provide similar quantity, quality, and service as 
domestic producers, but at lower prices, footwear manufacturers in developed countries 
have been caught in a squeeze. They are responding in several different ways. In the 
United States and Europe, an ‘If you can’t beat them, join them’ attitude has evolved 
among many smaller and mid-sized shoe firms, who feel they can not compete with the 
low cost of foreign-made goods and thus they are defecting to the ranks of importers. The 
decision of many larger manufacturers in developed countries, however, is no longer 
whether to engage in foreign production, but how to organize and manage it. These firms 
supply intermediate inputs (cut leather, soles, thread, buttons, etc.) to extensive networks 
of offshore suppliers, typically located in neighboring countries with reciprocal trade 
agreements that allow goods assembled offshore to be re-imported with a tariff charged 
only on the value added by foreign labor. This kind of international subcontracting 
system exists in every region of the world (Cheng, 1996; 2001). 
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however, who are de-emphasizing their production activities in favor of building up the 
marketing side of their operations by capitalizing on both brand names and retail outlets 
(Donaghu et al., 1990; Barff & Austen, 1993; Frenkel, 2001). The strengthening of brand 
names has led to a new focus on ‘concept stores’ that typically feature all the products 
offered by manufacturers and marketers, such as Nike, Adidas, Puma, Timberland, Geox, 
but also Levi Strauss, Disney, and Warner Bros. These stores provide a direct link 
between manufacturers and consumers, bypassing the traditional role of retailers. Thus, a 
de-verticalization of production co-exists with a re-verticalization of brands and stores.  
To sum up, since the 1970s, the competitive pressure in U.S. footwear market has lead to 
important transformations in terms of production processes alongside permanent (and 
increasingly accelerated) product innovation (Hadjimichael, 1990; Donaghu et al., 1990; 
Barff et al., 1993; Frenkel, 2001). Moreover, this innovative pressure affected the 
industrial organization of the footwear sector throughout the entire sectoral chain of 
production. Several authors have analyzed the complex and globalized value chains of the 
footwear industry (Donaghu et al., 1990; Barff et al., 1993; Korzeniewicz, 1994; Frenkel, 
2001). 
4.  The global, modular, buyer-driven value chain since the 1980s 
The U.S. footwear market was characterized by a relatively homogeneous product quality 
at the beginning of the 20
th century as the USMC dominated it. Once the machinery 
monopoly was broken by court rulings in 1953, other nations began to copy the relatively 
simple production mechanisms. And once the retailing-manufacturing link was opened, 
retailers began to search the country – and the globe – for cheap manufactures. While 
many conflicting explanations have been offered for the developments, which occurred in 
the succeeding decades, the record of facts is strikingly clear. Imported shoes trickled in 
during the 1950s and by 1961 accounted for only 6% of the number and 2.6% of the 
value of the U.S. market. But the trend by the late 1960s was so steep that by 1971 
imports made up one third of all shoe sales in the USA, and by 1981, imports accounted 
more than 51% of all sales, in 1991 more than 85%. By 2001, more than 98% of all sold 
shoes are imported. During these years of decline of the U.S. footwear industry, the 
market was expanding fast. Retailing margins were increasing, and the big U.S. branded 
marketers emerged.  
Today, economic activity in the footwear industry is not only international in scope, it is 
also global in organization (Donaghu et al., 1990; Korzeniewicz, 1992; Barff et al., 1993; 
Weisskoff, 1994; Korzeniewicz, 1994; Rabellotti, 1995; Cheng, 1996; Frenkel, 2001; 
Cheng, 2001; Schmél, 2002; Vale & Caldeira, 2004). ‘Internationalization’ refers to the 
geographic spread of economic activities across national boundaries. As such, it is not a 
new phenomenon; indeed, it has been a prominent feature of the world economy since at 
least the 17th Century when colonial empires began to carve up the globe in search of 
raw materials and new markets for their manufactured exports. ‘Globalization’ is much 
more recent than internationalization because it implies the functional integration and 
coordination of internationally dispersed activities.  
Industrial and commercial capital have promoted globalization by establishing a ‘buyer-
driven’ value chain for the U.S. footwear market. The U.S. footwear industry must be 
  21called a buyer-driven commodity chain, because global buyers, i.e., large retailers, 
branded marketers, and branded manufacturers play the pivotal roles in setting up 
decentralized production networks in a variety of exporting countries, typically located in 
the East Asia. This pattern of trade-led industrialization has also become common in 
other labor-intensive, consumer goods industries such as garments, toys, housewares, 
consumer electronics, and a variety of handicrafts. Production is generally carried out by 
tiered networks of Third World contractors that make finished goods to the specifications 
of foreign buyers. Global footwear value chain is characterized by highly competitive, 
locally owned, and globally dispersed production systems, sometimes co-organized by 
local traders and other buyers (Cheng, 1996; 2001). Profitability is greatest in the 
relatively concentrated in the retailing and branding process that is characterized by high 
barriers to the entry of new firms. 






Notes: Solid arrows are primary relationships, dashed arrows are secondary relationships.
U.S.A. Overseas
 
Profits in this buyer-driven chain are derived not from scale, volume, and technological 
advances as in producer-driven chains, but rather from unique combinations of high-
value research, design, sales, marketing and financial services that allow the retailers, 
branded marketers and branded manufacturers to act as strategic brokers in linking 
overseas factories with evolving product niches in the main consumer markets. Thus, 
whereas producer-driven commodity chains are controlled by industrial firms at the point 
of production, the main leverage in buyer-driven chains is exercised by retailers and 
marketers through their ability to shape mass consumption via strong brand names and 
their reliance on global sourcing strategies to meet this demand. These lead firms are 
frame with thick lines in figure 6.  
  22In the footwear value chain for the U.S. market, entry barriers are low for most tanning 
factories, although progressively higher as one moves upstream to shoes; brand names 
and stores are alternative competitive assets firms can use to generate significant 
economic rents. The lavish advertising budgets and promotional campaigns required to 
create and sustain global brands, and the sophisticated and costly information 
technologies employed by today’s mega-retailers to develop ‘quick response’ programs 
that increase revenues and lower risks by getting suppliers to manage inventory, illustrate 
recent techniques that have allowed retailers and marketers to displace traditional 
manufacturers as the leaders in the U.S. footwear industry and later in other consumer 
goods industries.  
The value chain for the athletic footwear submarket in the U.S.A. is particularily well 
analyzed (e.g. Donaghu et al., 1990; Barff et al., 1993; Korzeniewicz, 1994; Frenkel, 
2001), possibly because it has been the submarket that grew most during the emergence 
of the modular value chain for the U.S. footwear market. Nevertheless, virtually all shoes 
Americans buy today are procured by a buyer-driven, global, and modular value chain.  
IV.  DISCUSSION 
The U.S. footwear industry has served as the exemplar cases for two different theories of 
industrial organization. First, Schumpeter (1939) draws on the organization of the U.S. 
footwear industry of the 1930s to develop his hypothesis about the positive correlation of 
innovation activities and market concentration. Second, since the 1980s the U.S. footwear 
industry is organized in modular and global ways that serves as a exemplar case for the 
concept of a buyer-driven value chain in the analyses of Gereffi and his colleagues (1994; 
2005). The aim of this case study has been to describe the industrial dynamics in the U.S. 
footwear market from being Schumpeter’s exemplar case to being the exemplar case for 
buyer-driven global value chain. This section discusses this transition in terms of the 
theoretical proposition elaborated above. 
1.  The U.S.M.C is a Schumpeterian exemplar 
The United Shoe Machinery Company of the 1930s served as an exemplar case for 
Schumpeter to develop his famous hypothesis. The development of the U.S.M.C. since its 
establishment in 1899 sketches out Schumpeter’s theoretical argument that leads to the 
formulation of his hypothesis. Founded as a dominant firm in the U.S. footwear market, 
the U.S.M.C. establishes a highly efficient organization for research and development to 
increase its innovativeness and, thereby, establishes its dominant market position. By 
reinvesting its oligopoly rents from the U.S. market into R&D processes the U.S.M.C 
was able to expand internationally. By the 1930s, the U.S.M.C. dominates the global 
footwear production. As the machinery is leased to the actual producers, we argue that 
the U.S.M.C. virtually integrates the global footwear production in the 1930s: the 
U.S.M.C. is the lead firm in this producer-driven value chain for the global footwear 
market. At that time, the distribution and retailing of footwear in the U.S.A. are not 
integrated into the lead firm, i.e., excluded from the core of the value chain. Nevertheless, 
retailing and distribution concentrate between the 1920s and the 1960s. The international 
expansion of the U.S.M.C. is by and large a technology transfer to the actual shoe 
producers who are leasing the machinery (Miranda, 2004). Hence, the U.S.M.C. develops 
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shoemakers as they do not get price reductions due to larger production sizes. The driver 
of the transformation of the value chain in the 1970s has not been the increase in the 
capabilities of the actual producers, as the U.S.M.C.’s technology transfer started in the 
1910s.  
2.  Industrial dynamics and functional satiation 
The case study has described the historical development of the U.S. footwear industry 
from being a producer-driven to being a buyer-driven value chain. Our theoretical 
proposition explains this transition as an endogenous process of market development. It 
has to be pointed out that the law suit breaking the U.S.M.C.’s monopoly is probably 
essential to the start of this transformation of the industrial structure. As an event cannot 
drive a transformation process alone, the law suit is not the driving force behind the 
observed industrial dynamics. Between 1930 and the 1960s the U.S.M.C.’s monopoly is 
characterized by increasing relative shoe prices, relatively few trademark registrations 
and relative low market growth with respect to the growth of overall personal income, cf. 
figures 2, 3, and 5. Market growth accelerates since the 1970s with the falling of prices 
and the acceleration of trademark registrations and the growth of product variety (Frenzel 
Baudisch, 2006b), cf. figure 2, 3, and 5. The separation of manufacturing and product 
innovation is driven by the internationalization of the value chain, cf. figure 4, as 
production is outsourced to low-wage countries. This development accounts for the 
overall price declines since the 1970s. Freeman and Kleiner (1998) show that U.S. 
producers cannot produce ever new product variety, thereby, reduce batch sizes, and 
simultaneously reduce costs in this labor-intensive industry. The increasing importance of 
innovation and price competition in parallel drives the separation of product innovation 
and manufacturing, i.e., the industrial dynamics that lead to the establishment of the 
buyer-driven value chain for the U.S. footwear market. We draw on Adner and 
Levinthal’s (2001) model of market growth beyond functional satiation driven by variety 
oversupply in order to argue that price and innovation competition become more 
important at the same time, as the market becomes functionally satiated.  
3.  The U.S. footwear industry as a buyer-driven value chain 
The global value chain of the U.S. footwear industry is particularly well researched 
(Hadjimichael, 1990; Donaghu et al., 1990; Korzeniewicz, 1992; Barff et al., 1993; 
Korzeniewicz, 1994; Cheng, 1996; Frenkel, 2001). It serves Gereffi and his colleagues as 
an exemplar case for a buyer-driven value chain (cf. Gereffi et al., 1994; 1999; 2005). 
The footwear industry is certainly one of the first industries to become truly globalized in 
its sourcing network and procurement system. This is probably because shoe production 
is highly labor-intensive and because the product is relatively simple in terms of 
technology, which makes global outsourcing easy and highly profitable. The outsourcing 
of production to low-wage countries accounts for the decrease in relative prices since the 
1970s.  
Since the 1970s the U.S. footwear market grows due to the acceleration of the growth of 
product variety, cf. figure 5. As demand for innovations is necessarily uncertain, the 
increasing importance of product innovation for the growth of firms increases the demand 
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utility for innovations and, thereby, increase the uncertainty of demand. Since 1970 the 
U.S. footwear market becomes increasingly competitive in terms of product innovation 
and at the same time product prices (Frenzel Baudisch, 2006b). Frenzel Baudisch (2006b) 
has identified this as a market regime of variety oversupply beyond functional satiation. 
The global and modular organization of the U.S. footwear industry as a buyer-driven 
value chain copes with this simultaneous increase in innovation and price competition.  
More user-orientation in the development of new products and in the organization of 
firms decreases the innovation-driven uncertainty of demand (von Hippel, 2005, ch.8). 
Von Hippel’s (2005, pp.107) can be used to explain the shifting focus of lead firms on 
marketing, product development, and distribution, i.e., user-orientation, because the U.S. 
footwear demand becomes more uncertain and innovation-driven since the 1970s. 
Secondly, in order to increase their re-agility towards demand uncertainty firms have to 
reduce the lead times of production. In order to reduce lead times in a value chain firms 
have to optimize the organization of the sourcing, transport, and communication in the 
whole procurement network (cf. Fisher et al., 1996; Randall et al., 2003; O'Marah, 2005). 
The growing demand uncertainty increases the need for fast reagility towards 
unforeseeable demand shifts. Hence, the rising importance of product innovation for the 
growth of demand, increases the importance for firms to manage their value chain tightly 
and thoroughly. Functional satiation effects increase the uncertainty of demand with 
respect to product functionality and, thereby, foster a firm’s need to optimize its value 
chain.  
As the marginal utility for new product functionalities decreases, the ability to introduce 
ever new product varieties is less and less a function of the firm’s ability to innovate 
within the production processes. The importance of process innovations decreases 
because of ever smaller batch sizes and the decreasing importance of the actual 
production processes for the development of new products imply that price reductions of 
end products are rather achieved by the off-shoring of production processes to low-wage 
countries. 
4.  Athletic footwear submarket 
While the whole U.S. footwear industry is taken as an exemplar case for a buyer-driven 
value chain, the athletic footwear industry has attracted the most attention in this stream 
of research (Donaghu et al., 1990; Barff et al., 1993; Korzeniewicz, 1994; Frenkel, 2001). 
The U.S. athletic footwear industry grew particularly fast in the 1980s and 1990s. Large 
firms in this market as Nike, for example, have been “born global” as they have been 
founded as the lead firm of their buyer-driven value chains, never possessing any 
production capacities. The U.S. athletic industry pioneered the organizational concept of 
a buyer-driven value chain in the 1970s, which might be the explanation for the research 
attention this sub-industry has received. The question why it was the athletic footwear 
industry be among the first to organized in a modular value chain is not answered. We 
can only take an educated guess here pointing to the extremely high labor intensity in this 
sub-market due to complex product designs with complicated sewing patterns, which 
results in probably the highest profitability of outsourcing in the whole shoe market. The 
growth of the U.S. athletic market is also driven by a change in consumer behavior, i.e., 
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‘fitness fad’ (e.g. Hadjimichael, 1990 in the executive summary).  
5.  History matters 
In the historical development of the U.S. footwear industry and of particular firms 
historical developments and path dependencies are of importance. For example, the 
athletic shoe firm Nike has been born ‘global’, i.e. Nike has never possessed any 
production capacities since its foundation in 1964 (Donaghu et al., 1990; Willigan, 1992; 
Katz, 1994). From the beginning on Nike has had a global and modular organization 
developing its products in the U.S. and outsourcing production to low-wage countries in 
East Asia. Opposed to Nike, Adidas has been producing in Germany since the 1920s and 
starts setting up factories in East Asia in only in the 1980s, because it suffers severely 
from the innovation and price competition. Only after Adidas has set up a global and 
modular value chain analysis it is able to compete with Nike in terms of product 
innovation and prices (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2005). Comparing the 
developments of Nike and Adidas hints at organizational inertia and historical patterns 
with these companies.  
The first major off-shoring locations of the U.S. footwear industry in the 1960s and 1970s 
have been Japan, and later South Korea and Taiwan (e.g. Weisskoff, 1994). As these 
early producers were gradually upgrading their industries towards more complex 
production processes, the local wages increased. This made the U.S. lead firms of the 
value chains for the apparel and footwear market re-allocate production sites to countries 
with lower wage levels, namely Indonesia, Vietnam, and mainly China (Gereffi, 1999; 
Frenkel, 2001). The earlier producers in South Korea and Taiwan transformed themselves 
into intermediaries or traders for the U.S.-based lead firm that were distributing, 
marketing, and designing the products (Cheng, 1996; 2001). The development of the 
global value chain for the U.S. footwear market is shaped by the historical development 
of firms and their locations. In short, history matters for the formation of the modular and 
global value chain for the U.S. footwear market.  
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
The U.S. footwear industry in the 1930s has served as an exemplar case of industrial 
evolution for Schumpeter (1939, ch. VI, VII, and XIV) to develop his famous hypothesis 
about the positive correlation of innovative activity and firm size. At the start of the 
industry the provision of production technology and production has been the core node of 
this industry’s value chain in accordance with the Schumpeter hypothesis. On the other 
hand, the U.S. footwear industry in the 1980s and 1990s serves Gereffi and his coauthors 
(1994; 2005) to develop their notion of buyer-driven value chains for their industrial 
analyses. Finally, Frenzel Baudisch (2006b) shows that U.S. footwear consumption since 
the 1970s is increasingly driven by social comparison processes. According to the 
theoretical proposition about the influence of consumer motivations on the nature of 
competition in the U.S. footwear industry, the core node of the global footwear chain 
shifts to marketing, product design, and distribution, as the market becomes driven by 
variety oversupply in the 1970s.  
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oversupply and on Frenzel Baudisch’s (2006b) theoretical account about consumer 
motivations to ‘over-demand’ product varieties beyond their functional requirements we 
propose an explanation for the transformation of the U.S. footwear industry as an 
endogenous process. We argue that functional satiation effects U.S. demand for footwear 
and increases the demand uncertainty for suppliers introducing new functionalities. The 
basic argument is that this increase in demand uncertainty leads to the transformation of 
the U.S. footwear industry, from being Schumpeter’s exemplar case to being the 
exemplar case for a buyer-driven value chain in the works of Gereffi and his coauthors. 
When the functional requirements of consumers are met, their marginal utility for further 
product varieties decreases. When a market gets functionally satiated, this lead to the 
simultaneous competition with respect to innovations and prices, as producer cannot 
decrease price competition by introducing new product varieties any more. The 
organizational separation of the processes of product innovation and manufacturing into 
different firms provide specialization and greater economies than when integrating both 
processes in firm. The separation of product innovation from manufacturing is made 
possible as the firm’s competitive advantage is built on its capacities to organize its value 
chain, and not by its capacity to actually produce goods. The organization of the value 
chain aims at the reduction of lead times in order to increase the lead firm’s ability to 
react to unforeseen demand shifts, which are independent from the product 
functionalities, like in herding behaviors or fashion cycles.  
Functional satiation occurs when the functional requirements of consumers with respect 
to particular product characteristics are met. This leads to simultaneous price and 
innovation competition and increases the demand uncertainty for suppliers with respect to 
product functionalities. In such a competitive market situation the firms’ capacities to 
organizes the provision, sourcing and production of goods becomes more important than 
their technological or productive capacities. In this sense, we have argued on the basis of 
the transition of the U.S. footwear market that functional demand satiation leads to the 
separation of product innovation and manufacturing and the  modular organization of an 
industry’s value chain.  We theoretically integrate demand effects to explain  industry 
dynamics, i.e., to explain the endogenous process of industry organization from a highly 
integrated and concentrated industry that is an exemplar case for the Schumpeter 
hypothesis to being a buyer-driven global value chain.  
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